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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
09/993,127	11/14/2001	Gyung-Yun Chwa	678-713 (P9688)	6212

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EXAMINER
BAYERL, RAYMOND J

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
2173	

DATE MAILED: 11/06/2006

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE <u>3</u> MONTH(S) OR THIRTY (30) DAYS, WHICHEVER IS LONGER, FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

1)☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on *16 October 2006*.

2a)☐ This action is **FINAL**.   2b)☒ This action is non-final.

3)☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

4)☒ Claim(s) *6, 9 - 17* is/are pending in the application.

    4a) Of the above claim(s) _____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.

5)☒ Claim(s) *12 - 13, 15* is/are allowed.

6)☒ Claim(s) *6, 9 - 11, 14, 17* is/are rejected.

7)☒ Claim(s) *16* is/are objected to.

8)☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

9)☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.

10)☒ The drawing(s) filed on *14 November 2001* is/are: a)☒ accepted or b)☐ objected to by the Examiner.

    Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).

    Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).

11)☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

12)☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).

    a)☒ All b)☐ Some * c)☐ None of:

      1.☒ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.

      2.☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.

      3.☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).

    * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

1)☐ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)

2)☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)

3)☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO/SB/08)
    Paper No(s)/Mail Date _____.

4)☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
    Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____.

5)☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application

6)☐ Other: _____.

1.   The text of those sections of Title 35, U.S. Code not included in this action can be found in a prior Office action.

2.   Claims 6, 9 – 11, 14, 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Smethers ("Smethers"; US #6,560,640 B2) in view of Mintz ("Mintz"; US #6,250,930 B1).

As per independent claim 6, Smethers discloses a system that allows a user to bookmark web pages on a handheld device. The user programs the bookmarks manually and identifies a bookmark with a specific number. Thus, Smethers teaches "selecting one of a plurality of bookmarks, wherein each bookmark includes a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) field for saving an address of an Internet resource" (col. 3 lines 1-6 & col. 3 lines 34-44).

When a Smethers user has launched a bookmark, the bookmark has an identifier, the identifier is a button key, and when the key is pressed, it is used to point to the stored URL, which launches a document or file to be displayed to the browser.

The difference between the claims and Smethers is that the claim recites the use of "a browser ID field for saving a browser ID used to select a corresponding browser from the plurality of browsers" and "launching a browser of the plurality of browsers corresponding to the browser ID". Smethers has a single implied browser that is referenced by such URL names as http://www.uplanet.com/stocks.html (see fig 4), but does not **explicitly** teach that a "plurality of browsers" may be referenced through such stored bookmark information.

However, Mintz teaches a system for allowing a user to view web-browsing information on the Internet on a single screen similar to that of Smethers. In addition, Mintz discloses "launching a browser of the plurality of browsers corresponding to the browser ID, the launched browser interpreting a URL of the selected bookmark, and accessing the Internet resource" (col. 7 lines 58-65): Mintz teaches the launching of multiple browsers that can be incorporated into a memo, message, survey, questionnaire or direct mail piece, all of which can be simultaneously displayed on a single screen, where the e-Logic system is capable of transforming the multimedia e-mail message into the equivalent of a web page (col 6, lines 49 – 64). Currently, the e-Logic system permits about fifteen independent browsers to be simultaneously (rather than sequentially) displayed on a single screen (while about fifty browsers can be simultaneously displayed on multiple screens). This allows for the simultaneous search, viewing and transmittal of multiple search engines, multiple web sites, bookmarks or any combination thereof.

Mintz's multiple browsers can present a variety of forms of information—A variety of multimedia file formats may be embedded in an e-Logic mail message, these including Microsoft Word documents (*.doc), Microsoft Excel spreadsheets (*.xls), Microsoft Excel worksheets (*.xlw) and Powerpoint presentations (*.ppt) (col 5, lines 24 – 52). This means that the bookmarks that are used in Mintz will carry a "browser ID of a selected bookmark" in order to cause the content referenced to be properly presented by the proper application program, when it supplies the kind of "browser" needed to represent the web page-equivalent in the message. Typically, and as is suggested by

Mintz, the file extension (e.g., (*.doc), (*.xls)) will signify to the rendering device just

what kind of "browser" implementation should be employed. The application-specific

objects require their corresponding application to be invoked, in order to be viewable

during a "browser" session.

Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the

time the invention was made to modify the launching of a browser as taught by

Smethers to include a launch from a particularly-specified browser process as in Mintz,

in order to obtain a system that allows the user to bookmark information of URL web

pages and have a plurality of browser types for producing a useful result. Motivation

lies at least in Smethers, where the rendering of a bookmark is intended to give a user a

useful result, and in the case of content encoded in a non-standard format besides

markup language, a reference in the stored bookmark information needs to specify the

correct destination for the multimedia content that is accessed from the Internet.

As per claim 9, where "the browser ID field is 8 bits", and claim 10, in which "the

URL field is 64 bits", it was notoriously well known in the art that a browser ID and

Uniform Resource Locator field must contain some certain number of bits, and also that

it was notoriously well known to employ power of two bit-multiples, such as 1, 2, 4, 8,

16, 32, 64, 128, etc. Please note, for example, that Smethers states that a Bookmark

ID is preferably **two bytes** in size (col. 12 line 42; this meaning 16 bits).

The examiner takes OFFICAL NOTICE of the ubiquity of power of two bit-

multiples for encoding items in storage, and it would have been obvious to a person of

ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention was made to modify the bit size of

Smethers/Mintz to such standard values as are claimed. This permits the binary-operating computer system an optimum efficiency in handling the data for bookmarks as it is accessed.

As per claim 11, which recites, "the URL field is a string with null termination", it was also notoriously well known to those of ordinary skill in the art that a URL field is a string with null termination, since the data of a URL is of a "string" format, and when it ends, a "null" is used as contrast to the main portion of the "string".

The examiner further takes OFFICAL NOTICE that a "URL field" must end with a termination after a set of characters. It is important for strings to end with a termination, which can be any type of termination character, i.e. null sign, pound sign, or asterisk symbol, for the logic encoded in an information handling system, so that system is able to determine the ending of the set of characters in a string field. It would therefore have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention was made to modify the URL string of Smethers/Mintz to include a null character for a termination character, so that the information would be properly delimited for the purposes of storage and access in the bookmark system disclosed by both Smethers and Mintz.

Independent claim 14 reiterates the claim 6 function, when its "program" will "launch the particular browser according to the browser ID" that is designated by the use of a "bookmark frame" that has "a browser ID (identification) field and a URL (Uniform Resource Locator) field". However, and as has been noted above, the Smethers system of bookmark retention, where a "URL...field" is retained to "access the

Internet according to the URL", would have obviously benefited from the kind of

"browser ID"-specific functionality that is suggested by Mintz.

New claim 17's "browser" that "is a WEB browser for opening at least one file

located at an address indicated by the URL" is suggested by the way Mintz incorporates

the various file types into a web-mediated message. Even in the case of applications

other than standard, markup-language-interpreting renderers, the Mintz applications can

be said to be "a WEB browser" because of the web-origin of the material they present.

3.   Applicant's arguments filed 16 October 2006 have been fully considered but they

are not persuasive.

Applicant argues at page 6 that "it would not be obvious to one skilled in the art

to determine an exact browser to launch from a plurality of browsers using, for example,

the URL: http://www.uplanet.com/stocks.html." However, the Examiner has not stated

that Smethers choses from "a plurality of browsers" (something instead seen in Mintz),

but rather, that in the case of Smethers, there is a single browser that becomes default

for web browsing *.html pages, and is thus implied in a web URL.

At page 6 applicant then argues that "there is no mention in Smethers that a

browser for interpreting a URL is also included in the bookmark". But this is why the

Examiner has relied upon Mintz.

At pages 6 – 7, applicant argues that "in the present application, as recited by the

claims, the bookmark is included in an Internet terminal whereas Smethers teaches

storing the bookmark in proxy server device 116". However, the actual claims do not

recite such detail as to where the code is maintained for the bookmark. Claim 6 has

"selecting one of a plurality of bookmarks", which could be anywhere, and while claim

14's "apparatus for accessing the Internet" has a "memory for storing a bookmark

frame", the claim language merely calls for a combination of components (the

"apparatus") that is "for accessing the Internet using bookmarks in an Internet terminal".

The apparatus of Smethers, similarly, is "for accessing…in an Internet terminal", even if

its constituent "memory" is at a site other than the "terminal".

As per Mintz, applicant argues at page 7 that "Mintz discloses bookmarks are

general bookmarks as opposed to bookmarks including a browser ID, a recited by the

claims". However, the information within the bookmark information in Mintz is

associated with an indication of the kind of "browser" that is needed to open it.

Further concerning Mintz, applicant argues at page 7 that "Mintz teaches a

plurality of browsers are simultaneously displayed on a single screen…as opposed to a

method and an apparatus for selecting and launching a plurality of browsers according

to a specific URL". However, the plural browser instances made possible in Mintz must

have proper referencing information, both as to type and as to which of the browsers is

intended, in order to work. The multi-browser aspect of Mintz only serves to strengthen

it as a reference against the pending claims.

Applicant argues at page 7 that the use in Mintz of "terms" such as "*.xls", "*.jpg",

"*.doc" "refer to file name extensions, as opposed to a bookmark including a browser ID

corresponding to a particular browser, and a URL for launching the particular browser

according to the browser ID". However, the material obtained from the web access in

Mintz, when viewed using the multi-browser arrangement, must have properly-

referenced applications to assist in such viewing. These must be referred to by "a browser ID", such as the filename extension, or alternatively, the browser number among the plurality that is presented in Mintz. To answer applicant's page 8 argument, in the specific example of Mintz, it becomes possible that "a web-browser, a HTML-browser, etc." can be "an application", since it is material obtained from the web that must be rendered.

4.   Claims 12 – 13, 15 are allowable over the prior art now made of record.

Claim 12 has been amended such that "the bookmark file includes a first field including the ID corresponding to the selected browser and a second field located after the first field and including the URL", which distinguishes over the art of record. While a combination of "URL" and "ID" for a "browser" would in general be in use in the Smethers/Mintz combination, this does not teach or suggest a "bookmark file" format in which the two separate indications appear one after another.

5.   Claim 16 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.

The art of record also does not teach or suggest the handling of three "browser ID" possibilities that direct "WAP", "UP" and "HTML". Certainly Smethers, in dealing with *.html URLs, would include the "HTML" browser, and a number of "browser" types are seen in Mintz, but these do not include all three of the types in claim 16. Smethers in particular goes into no detail, should the access of web sites be extended to using these kinds of platform.

6.   Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Raymond J. Bayerl whose telephone number is (571) 272-4045. The examiner can normally be reached on M - Th from 9:30 AM to 4:30 PM ET.

7.   If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Kristine Kincaid, can be reached at 571-272-4063. All patent application related correspondence transmitted by FAX **must be directed** to the central FAX number (571) 273-8300.

8.   Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is (571) 272-2100.

RAYMOND J. BAYERL
PRIMARY EXAMINER
ART UNIT 2173
2 November 2006